THE REFORM OF CUSTOMS SYSTEM IN POLAND
The accession of Poland to the European Union has evoked the necessity of extending the force of the valid EU customs regulations into our territory. The Polish sovereignty in its normative sense has been passed in the range of customs to the EU with few exceptions 1 , but the sovereignty in its executive sense has stayed within the competence of the Polish customs authorities. The sovereignty in its normative sense means the possession of full powers in the scope of imposing customs duty as well as granting customs reliefs and exemptions. The essence of the sovereignty in its executive sense is, on the contrary, the fact that only state authorities are entitled to make decisive powers regarding customs duty in a certain area. The creation of structure of customs administration stays within the individual competence of member states. The only requirement is creating a body that would be able to implement acquis communautarie and cooperate with customs administrations of other member states.
While discussing the reform of customs system one should fi rst of all think of the meaning of a customs system. The EU Customs Code defi nes customs authorities in a very general way -it says that they are authorities entitled, among other things, to use the regulations of customs law 2 . Before the accession of Poland to the EU the Director of the Customs Offi ce and the President of the Central Customs Offi ce used to be considered as customs authorities. In the course of preparations to the accession to the EU the President of the Central Customs Offi ce lost his position as the main customs authority in the Polish administration and his competence was taken over, pursuant to the Act on transformations in the customs administration, including amendments to some acts, dated 20 March 2002, by the competent Minister of Public Finance and by the directors of customs chambers 3 . As a result The customs offi ces that existed before 30 April 2002 were transformed into customs chambers as bodies which accompanied the directors of customs chambers, and some of the customs divisions were transformed into customs offi ces as bodies accompanying new authorities in the structure of customs administration i.e. the heads of customs offi ces. As a result of the implemented changes 17 customs chambers and 67 customs offi ces were created 6 . Customs Divisions are subordinate to Customs Offi ces, and the units of customs administrations called the customs stations were liquidated. A similar, three-level structure of administration, in the scope of customs matters, may also be found in other member states of the EU, that is, in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Lithuania and Latvia.
Under the 20 May 2003 Act on Formation of Voivodeship Boards of Revenue and including amendments to some acts (which established tasks, the authorities' competences and the organization of organizational units subordinate to the competent minister of public fi nance) the so far competent authorities (revenue offi ces and chambers) lost their competence in the scope of excise tax. The role of tax authority in this scope and partially in the sphere of goods and services tax, was passed onto customs authorities 7 . The act came into force on 1 September 2003. Hence, these authorities play a double role -the one of customs authorities, and some of them (although not all) simultaneously act as tax authorities.
It may be stated that the customs administration is undergoing a continuous reform. In 1999 the Customs Service Act was passed, which was meant to adapt that formation to function as a public service in the EU. It sets special requirements to the candidates for customs offi cers and to people already working as such offi cers. The ---public aspect of customs service is the fact that the actions of customs offi cers create the respect towards state authorities and trust on the side of the citizens. The offi cial relationships of uniformed services are not of employment nature, but they are administrative relationships created when an offi cer starts his service. The specifi c nature of the uniformed service means, among other things, full availability for work and obedience towards the authorities, discipline when being on duty, fulfi lling tasks within the unlimited time and in diffi cult conditions (which sometimes pose risk to health or life 8 ) limited participation in political life, no possibility of a strike, prohibition to run own business, statutory limitation in having additional place of employment etc.
In January 2008 Poland faced a wave of protests made by the offi cers of Customs Service. Pursuant to Art. 33 Section 2 of the Customs Service Act, a customs offi cer must not participate in a strike or any activity that disturbs the work of a customs offi ce. Due to that, customs offi cers used to go on sick leaves or asked their superiors for a day off to which they are entitled to, pursuant to the Labour Code. That spontaneous protest action of customs offi cers was caused, among other things, by the regulations included in the Customs Service Act, namely Art. 25 Section 1 Points 8a and 8b of that Act. This regulation introduced obligatory dismissal of a customs offi cer from his/her service in the case of a charge of deliberate commission of an indictable offence brought against him/her, or in the case of provisional detention. The General Trade Union of Customs Service in Poland questioned the above regulation stating, among other things, that it limits rights and freedom of offi cers in the way that is not justifi ed in a democratic state. Furthermore, it states that the provisions do not include the possibility of restoration of a customs offi cer dismissed on the basis of an objective regulation on conditional discontinuance of criminal proceedings and on discontinuance of criminal proceedings 9 . The Constitutional Tribunal decided in its 13 February 2007 Judgment that the objective regulation is in accordance with the Constitution. In particular, it referred to the General Public Prosecutor's standpoint that the special rigours of customs service are compensated to the offi cers by granting them special retirement and pension entitlements. The paradox is that customs offi cers, as the only one uniformed service, are not covered by a retirement plan of uniformed services. In practice, Art. 25 Section 1 (8a) and (8b) of the Customs Service Act has started to be used by smugglers to intimidate customs offi cers.
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The examination conducted at the border crossing points with the Kaliningrad Oblast has proved that about 70% of customs offi cers faced the threat of battery or denunciation of taking bribes, which pursuant to Art. Another reason for the protest was a proposal made in the project of the KAS Act regarding the implementation of the so called zero option, that is, the dissolution of employment relationship with all customs offi cers and then re-appointment only some of them. Although the zero option is justifi ed in the case of territorial selfgovernment reform, it is an unsuccessful idea with reference to customs offi cers. The employer remains the same. Specifi c identifi ed problems in the Customs Service should be fought with, and not only seemingly eliminated through the so called zero options. One-time action will not eliminate the phenomenon of corruption. Only creating mechanisms which would detect unfavourable phenomena will permanently clear the customs offi cers' environment from the so called 'black sheep'. The zero option will, on the contrary, strike both the corrupted customs offi cers and the honest ones. Another reason for a 'strike' is unequal treatment of customs offi cers in comparison with other uniformed services. Due to the liquidation of border crossing points in the South and West in 2004, the so called allocation of customs offi cers from the western border crossing points and inland organization units to customs chambers in the East of Poland took place. However, in December 2007 after our accession to the Schengen zone, the similar mechanism was not implemented in the case of the Border Guard with its many more offi cers. Such an unequal treatment of customs offi cers in comparison with other uniformed services may result from the fact that customs offi cers are commonly associated with a profession of negative emotional connotation and a very negative opinion in the social consciousness 10 . A new function of the customs service as a formation protecting the society against terrorism, drugs, epidemiological threats remains totally unnoticed.
In the course of the protest there were proposals to replace the Polish customs offi cers with the ones from other member states of the EU. It has to be categorically emphasized that there are no regulations that would allow to employ foreign citizens to protect the state. The on-duty acts on behalf of the Polish state may be performed within the territory of Poland exclusively by the customs offi cers who have the Polish citizenship 11 . The rule of exercising sovereign superior rights in the range of customs and protection of the Polish customs territory as a part of the EU customs territory is best guaranteed by performing customs service by its own citizens exclusively. As a matter of fact, . In practice the above regulation was 'dead law' as no customs offi cer moved to the Polish Customs Service from another member state. The above regulation was annulled by the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of 11 January 2005 14 .
As a result of the protest action the customs administration obtained pay rise in the amount of 244,45 Polish zlotys from the budget act and 245,55 Polish zlotys from the reserve fund no. 60, which gave total amount of 499 Polish zlotys for an employee 15 . From the statement made by the Chief of the Customs Service on 27 March 2008 on the forum of the Board of Administration and Internal Affairs and the Board of Public Finance it appears that the average salary in the Customs Service at its lower positions is higher than the one in the Border Guard. Why then do customs offi cers organize a protest action if they earn more than the Border Guard offi cers? It should be emphasized that a Border Guard offi cer is automatically promoted after the statutory period onto a higher position which includes pay rise, whereas many people in the Customs Service remain on the same position for a several dozen years, in spite of their high qualifi cations. It is closely associated with dramatic resignation of people from work in the Customs Service. At some border crossing points the newly admitted offi cers make only 30-40% of the staff. The customs offi cers who remain in the preparatory service are not entitled to serve goods movement and therefore the Customs Service may shortly face the problem of staff shortage, especially due to the fact that the number of crossing points at the eastern borders does not meet the needs of the border movement. Even if the customs offi cers do not organize protests, the queues at the border crossing points are up to a few dozen hours.
The customs offi cer is a hybrid of a uniformed public offi cer and a civil worker -s/he pays social insurance contributions in the same way as all civil workers do, but his/her sick leaves are of full remuneration whereas the ones of civil workers are only 80% of the total remuneration. S/he is not entitled to receive the uniformed retirement benefi t, although s/he performs his/her duties wearing a uniform, and it has to be highlighted that s/he may be released from this obligation by his/her superior only in justifi ed circumstances. In case of accidents and diseases connected with his/her service the customs offi cer is entitled to benefi ts that are established for the police offi cers. Comparing retirement benefi ts of the Rail Protection Service, which may be treated as a state industrial guard, it seems that the refusal of uniformed benefi ts to customs offi cers is an unjustifi ed discrimination of this occupational group. The division of persons employed in the customs administration into civil service and customs service, where there is no division into persons performing duties provided by the statute and representing public authority -and the persons who contribute to functioning of a particular organization unit, is not essentially justifi ed. The people perform the same work in the same organization units, but are paid totally different salary. A border offi cer or a policeman working at his/her desk does not lose uniformed benefi ts if the activities performed by such people are fulfi lled as duties provided by the Police Act or the Border Guard Act. Only in the Police, the positions where the duties are not directly related to performing statutory tasks of the particular service (like human resources, payments department, logistics or general departments) are treated as civil ones. As far as acting on behalf of the state is concerned, the public offi cer is supported by the authority of his/ her uniform which emphasizes the power that s/he performs on behalf of the state. Moreover, such a person has to be distinguished in order to be easily identifi ed by the citizens, which makes the public service more recognizable and signals clearly to the citizens that this person serves the society. The division in the customs system may be organized in a similar way with the emphasis on enabling the customs offi cers to change the customs service into the civil one. Performing customs service is dependent on meeting certain special requirements which, with the lapse of time, may not be fulfi lled, either temporarily or permanently, by the offi cer, e.g. in cases of disability that does not entitle to disability benefi t, or lack of full fl exibility to work irregular hours for single parents who bring up minor children.
A fundamental question should now be raised -in what direction does the reform of the Customs Service go? The reform of the Customs Services aims at improving the effectiveness of its service towards the society. With regard to high rotation of staff the offi cers should obviously be ensured the salary at such a level that would make them resistant to corruption, but it would also be benefi cial to organize psychological training courses on how to cope with corruption offers.
The draft of an act on the amendment to the Customs Service Act and on amendments to some acts of 14 March 2008 imposed new requirements on the customs offi cers 16 . Many solutions included in the draft of the act bring the Customs Service closer to uniformed services, e.g. possibility to move staff between uniformed services and the Customs Service, the establishment of similar ranks and bodies, legal protection, or bonuses for performing duties in special conditions. In the sphere of competence it grants the Customs Service entitlements to operational and reconnaissance activities as well as the right to possess personal weapon. In the face of drafted amendments and imposing new obligations and restrictions on the customs offi cers, the Customs Service is explicitly becoming a service of requirements imposed on the uniformed services.
With the application of the restrictions typical for uniformed formations, the customs offi cers are simultaneously refused the privileges which should compensate the inconveniences resulting from serving the society. Furthermore, if the state imposes greater requirements on the customs offi cers, it should itself act loyally towards them. On the other hand, mechanisms fi ghting negative phenomena should be created for the Customs Service, and that could be e.g. granting the control services powers to use provocation towards those offi cers who are suspected of corruption. One of the best solutions that would ensure the offi cers' resistance to corruptive factors would be the introduction of state retirement, lost in the case of proving the offi cer gaining the fi nancial benefi t related to the function performed.
